We consider a secure communication over a twouser Gaussian interference channel, where each transmitter sends a confidential message to its legitimate receiver. For this setting, we identify a regime where the simple scheme of using Gaussian wiretap codebook at each transmitter (without cooperative jamming) and treating interference as noise at each intended receiver (in short, GWC-TIN scheme) achieves the optimal secure sum capacity to within a constant gap. For the symmetric case, this simple scheme is optimal when the interference-to-signal ratio (all link strengths in decibel scale) is no more than 2/3. However, when the ratio is more than 2/3, we show that this simple scheme is not optimal anymore and a scheme with cooperative jamming is proposed to achieve the optimal secure sum generalized degreesof-freedom (GDoF). Specifically, for the symmetric case, we complete the optimal secure sum GDoF characterization for any interference regimes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of information-theoretic secrecy was first introduced by Shannon in his seminal work [1] , which studied a secure communication in the presence of a private key that is revealed to both transmitter and legitimate receiver but not to the eavesdropper. Later, Wyner introduced the notion of secure capacity via a degraded wiretap channel, in which a transmitter intends to send a confidential message to a legitimate receiver by hiding it from a degraded eavesdropper [2] . The secure capacity is the maximum rate at which the confidential message can be transmitted reliably and securely to the legitimate receiver. Wyner's result was subsequently generalized to the non-degraded wiretap channel by Csiszàr and Körner [3] , and the Gaussian wiretap channel by Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman [4] . This line of secure capacity research has been extended to many multiuser channels, most notably, broadcast channels [5] - [9] , multiple access channels [10] - [15] , and interference channels [5] , [16] - [26] .
In the line of secure capacity research, cooperative jamming has been proposed extensively to improve the achievable secure rates in many channels (see [5] , [10] , [21] , [22] and references therein). In particular, cooperative jamming has been proposed in [21] and [22] to achieve the optimal secure sum degrees-of-freedom (DoF) in the interference channel with confidential messages, wiretap channel with helpers, multiple access wiretap channel, and the broadcast channel with confidential messages. The basic idea of the cooperative jamming scheme is to send jamming signals to confuse the potential eavesdroppers, while keeping legitimate receivers' Jinyuan Chen is with Louisiana Tech University, Department of Electrical Engineering, Ruston, LA 71272, USA (email: jinyuan@latech.edu). The work was partly supported by Louisiana Board of Regents Support Fund (BoRSF) Research Competitiveness Subprogram (RCS) under grant 32-4121-40336.
abilities to decode the desired messages. This might involve a cooperation between the transmitters, and a careful design on the direction and/or power of the cooperative jamming signals (see [5] , [10] , [21] , [22] ). It is therefore implicit that the cooperative jamming schemes might incur some extra overhead, e.g., due to network coordination, channel state information (CSI) acquisition, and power consumption. In this work we seek to understand when it is necessary to use cooperative jamming and when it is not, for the secure communication over the interference channel.
Specifically, we focus on a secure communication over a two-user Gaussian interference channel, where each transmitter sends a confidential message to its legitimate receiver. For this setting, we identify a regime in which the simple scheme of using Gaussian wiretap codebook at each transmitter, without cooperative jamming, and treating interference as noise at each intended receiver (in short, GWC-TIN scheme) achieves the optimal secure sum capacity to within a constant gap. The secrecy offered by this GWC-TIN scheme is informationtheoretic secrecy, which holds for any decoding methods at any unintended receiver (eavesdropper). In this simple scheme, the transmitters do not need to know the information of the channel phases. Therefore, the overhead associated with acquiring channel state information at the transmitters (CSIT) is minimal for the GWC-TIN scheme. For the symmetric case, this simple scheme is optimal when the interference-to-signal ratio (all link strengths in decibel scale) is no more than 2/3. However, when the ratio is more than 2/3, we show that this simple scheme is not optimal anymore and a scheme with cooperative jamming is proposed to achieve the optimal secure sum generalized degrees-of-freedom (GDoF).
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model and the scheme without cooperative jamming. Section III provides the main results of this work. The proofs are provided in Section IV, Section V and the appendices, while some other proofs are provided in [27] due to the lack of space here. The work is concluded in Section VI. Throughout this work, I(•), H(•) and h(•) denote the mutual information, entropy and differential entropy, respectively. (•) T denotes the transpose operation. Z, Z + , R and C denote the sets of integers, positive integers, real numbers, and complex numbers, respectively. (•) + = max{0, •}. Logarithms are in base 2.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
This section provides the system model and discusses the simple scheme without using cooperative jamming. 
A. Gaussian interference channel
We begin with a two-user (K = 2) Gaussian interference channel (see Fig. 1 ). By following the convention in [28] , the channel output at receiver k at time t is given by
is the channel input at transmitter subject to a normalized power constraint E|x (t)| 2 ≤ 1, z k (t) ∼ N (0, 1) is additive white Gaussian noise at receiver k, m k is a nonnegative integer, and h k ∈ (1, 2], for k, ∈ {1, · · · , K}. Note that all the channel gains greater than or equal to one can be represented in the form 2 m k h k under the aforementioned conditions. Therefore, the channel model in (1) is essentially the general case in terms of capacity approximations (cf. [28] ). Let us define
where P max k {2 2m kk }. Then, the original channel model can be rewritten by
where the exponent α k ≥ 0 represents the channel strength of the link between transmitter and receiver k, and h k ∈ (1, 2] represents the channel phase. In what follows, we will consider the channel model in (3) . It is assumed that each node knows all the channel strengths and phases. However, in the scheme without using cooperative jamming that will be discussed later on, the transmitters do not need to know the channel phases {h k } k, . For the symmetric case, it is assumed that
For this interference channel, transmitter k wishes to send to receiver k a message w k that is uniformly chosen from a set W k {1, 2, · · · , 2 nR k }, where R k is the rate (bits/channel use) of this message and n is the total number of channel uses. At transmitter k, a stochastic function f k : W k → X n k is employed to encode the message for k = 1, · · · , K. A secure rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) is said to be achievable if for any > 0 there exists a sequence of n-length codes such that each receiver can decode its own message reliably, i.e., Pr[w k = w k ] ≤ , ∀k, and the messages are kept secret such that I(w 1 ; y n 2 ) ≤ n (4)
where y n k represents the n-length channel output of receiver k, k = 1, 2. The secure capacity region C is the closure of the set of all achievable secure rate pairs. The secure sum capacity is defined as:
The secure sum GDoF is defined as
B. A Scheme without Cooperative Jamming
This subsection discusses a scheme without cooperative jamming, for the two-user Gaussian interference channel defined in Section II-A. In the proposed scheme without cooperative jamming, each transmitter simply employs a Gaussian wiretap codebook (GWC) to guarantee the secrecy without using cooperative jamming, while each receiver simply treats interference as noise (TIN) when decoding its desired message. It is called as a GWC-TIN scheme hereafter. Note that the secrecy offered by the GWC-TIN scheme is informationtheoretic secrecy, which holds for any decoding methods at any eavesdropper. Some details of the scheme are discussed as follows.
1) Gaussian wiretap codebook: To build the codebook, transmitter k generates a total of 2 n(R k +R k ) independent codewords v n k with each element independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) according to a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and variance P −β k , k = 1, 2, for some R k , R k and β k ≥ 0 that will be designed specifically later on. The codebook B k is defined as a set of the labeled codewords:
To transmit the message w k , transmitter k at first selects a bin (sub-codebook) B k (w k ) that is defined as
and then randomly chooses a codeword v n k from the selected bin according to a uniform distribution. Since this scheme will not use cooperative jamming, the chosen codeword v n k will be mapped exactly as a channel input sequence by transmitter k, that is, x k (t) = v k (t), t = 1, 2, · · · , n, where v k (t) is the tth element of the codeword v n k , k = 1, 2. Based on this one-toone mapping and Gaussian codebook, it implies that
Then, the received signals take the following forms (removing the time index for simplicity): (3)). In the above equations, the average power is noted under each summand term.
2) Treating interference as noise: In terms of decoding, each intended receiver simply treats interference as noise. This implies that receiver k can decode the codeword v n k (w k , w k ) with arbitrarily small error probability when n gets large and the rate of the codeword (i.e., R k + R k ) satisfies the following condition:
(cf. [29] ). Note that R k and R k represent the rates of the secure message w k and the confusion message w k , respectively (cf. (8)). Once the codeword v n k (w k , w k ) is decoded, the message w k can be decoded directly from the codebook mapping. At this point, let us set
for some > 0 and k, ∈ {1, 2}, k = . Obviously, R k and R k designed in (13) and (14) satisfy the condition in (12) .
3) Secure rate: From the proof of [22, Theorem 2] (or [5, Theorem 2]) it implies that, given the above wiretap codebook and the rates designed in (14) , the messages w 1 and w 2 are secure from their eavesdroppers, that is, I(w 1 ; y n 2 ) ≤ n and I(w 2 ; y n 1 ) ≤ n . Therefore, by letting → 0, the scheme achieves the secure rate pair R 1 = I(v 1 ; y 1 ) − I(v 1 ; y 2 |v 2 ) and R 2 = I(v 2 ; y 2 ) − I(v 2 ; y 1 |v 1 ). Due to the Gaussian inputs and outputs, this achievable secure rate pair is expressed as
for some β 1 , β 2 ≥ 0. By setting β 1 = α 21 and β 2 = α 12 , then the interference at each receiver is scaled down to the noise GDoF without secrecy constraints GDoF with secrecy constraints [Etkin, Tse, Wang08] Fig. 2 . GDoF vs. α for the two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel with and without secrecy constraints. Note that a simple scheme without using cooperative jamming achieves the optimal secure sum GDoF if and only if α ∈ [0, 2 3 ].
level (see (10) and (11)) and the achievable secure rate pair becomes
Note that the above secure rate pair is achieved by using a simple choice of β 1 and β 2 . One can improve the secure rate by selecting the optimized parameters of β 1 and β 2 . Note that in this GWC-TIN scheme, the transmitters do not need to know the realizations of {h k } k, .
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section we provide the main results of this work. At first we provide the secure sum GDoF characterization for the two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel defined in Section II-A. Theorem 1. Considering the two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel defined in Section II-A, for almost all channel realizations {h k } ∈ (1, 2] 2×2 , the optimal secure sum GDoF is characterized as
Moreover, a simple scheme without using cooperative jamming, that is, GWC-TIN scheme described in Section II-B, achieves the optimal GDoF if and only if α ∈ [0, 2 3 ]. Proof. The detailed proof is provided in the long version of this work [27] . When α ∈ [0, 2 3 ], the optimal secure sum GDoF is achievable by the proposed GWC-TIN scheme. When α ∈ ( 2 3 , 2), the optimal secure sum GDoF is achievable by 1122 the proposed scheme with cooperative jamming. Section V provides the outlines of the cooperative jamming scheme. Fig. 2 depicts the sum GDoF with secrecy constraint (cf. Theorem 1), as well as the sum GDoF without secrecy constraint (cf. [30] ), for the two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel. Note that the secrecy constraint incurs no penalty in sum GDoF if and only if α ∈ [0, 1 2 ]. In the following we focus on the general two-user Gaussian interference channel defined in Section II-A, and provide the optimality conditions in which the GWC-TIN scheme is optimal in terms of secure sum capacity to within a constant gap.
Theorem 2. For the two-user Gaussian interference channel defined in Section II-A, where α k denotes the channel strength from transmitter to receiver k, ∀k, ∈ {1, 2}, if the following conditions are satisfied,
then the simple scheme of using Gaussian wiretap codebook at each transmitter (without using cooperative jamming) and treating interference as noise at each intended receiver (that is, GWC-TIN scheme) achieves the optimal secure sum capacity C sum to within a constant gap of no larger than 11 bits. More specifically, given the conditions of (18) and (19), the optimal secure sum capacity C sum satisfies
where the lower bound C lb sum is defined by
Proof. As discussed in Section II-B, the GWC-TIN scheme achieves the secure sum capacity lower bound C lb sum (see (15) and (16)). To prove the optimality of the GWC-TIN scheme, we provide a secure sum capacity upper bound in Lemma 1 (see Section IV). The derived upper bound reveals that, if the conditions in (18) and (19) are satisfied, then the achievable secure sum rate of the GWC-TIN scheme indeed approaches the secure sum capacity to within a constant gap of no larger than 11 bits (see Appendix B for the details on bounding the gap).
IV. CONVERSE FOR THE GAUSSIAN CHANNEL
For the Gaussian interference channel defined in Section II-A, we provide an upper bound on the secure sum capacity, which is stated in the following lemma. Lemma 1. For the two-user Gaussian interference channel defined in Section II-A, the secure sum capacity is upper bounded by C sum
Let us now prove bound (20) in Lemma 1. At first we define that
wherez 1 (t) ∼ N (0, 1) is a virtual noise that is independent of the other noise and the transmitted signals. Let s n 11 {s 11 (t)} n t=1 and s n 12 {s 12 (t)} n t=1 . We begin with the rate of user 1:
where (23) follows from Fano's inequality, lim n→∞ 1,n = 0; (24) results from the secrecy constraint, i.e., I(w 1 ; y n 2 ) ≤ n for an arbitrary small . Similarly, for the rate of user 2 we have nR 2 ≤ I(w 2 ; y n 2 ) − I(w 2 ; y n 1 ) + n 2,n + n
which, together with (24), gives the following bound on the sum rate: nR 1 + nR 2 − n 1,n − n 2,n − 2n ≤I(w 1 ; y n 1 ) − I(w 1 ; y n 2 ) + I(w 2 ; y n 2 ) − I(w 2 ; y n 1 ) =h(y n 1 ) − h(y n 1 |w 1 ) − h(y n 2 ) + h(y n 2 |w 1 ) + h(y n 2 ) − h(y n 2 |w 2 ) − h(y n 1 ) + h(y n 1 |w 2 ) =h(y n 2 |w 1 ) − h(y n 1 |w 1 ) + h(y n 1 |w 2 ) − h(y n 2 |w 2 ).
Let us first focus on h(y n 2 |w 1 ) − h(y n 1 |w 1 ) in (26): h(y n 2 |w 1 ) − h(y n 1 |w 1 ) =h(s n 11 , y n 2 |w 1 ) − h(s n 11 |y n 2 , w 1 ) J1 − h(s n 11 , y n 1 |w 1 ) + h(s n 11 |y n 1 , w 1 ) J2 (27) =h(y n 2 |s n 11 , w 1 ) − h(y n 1 |s n 11 , w 1 ) − J 1 + J 2 =h(s n 12 , y n 2 |s n 11 , w 1 ) − h(s n 12 |y n 2 , s n 11 , w 1 ) J3 − h(y n 1 |s n 11 , w 1 ) − J 1 + J 2 =h(s n 12 |s n 11 , w 1 ) + h(y n 2 |s n 12 , s n 11 , w 1 ) J4 − h(y n 1 |s n 11 , w 1 ) − J 1 + J 2 − J 3 (28) =h(y n 1 |x n 1 , s n 11 , w 1 ) − h(y n 1 |s n 11 , w 1 
where J 1 h(s n 11 |y n 2 , w 1 ), J 2 h(s n 11 |y n 1 , w 1 ), J 3 h(s n 12 |y n 2 , s n 11 , w 1 ) and J 4 h(y n 2 |s n 12 , s n 11 , w 1 ); the steps from (27) to (28) follow from chain rule; (29) stems from that h(s n 12 |s n 11 , w 1 ) =h(s n 12 ) (31) =h(s n 12 |x n 1 , s n 11 , w 1 )
where (31) and (32) use the fact that s n 12 is independent of s n 11 , w 1 and x n 1 ; (33) follows from that h(a|b) = h(a + b|b) for any continuous random variables a and b. Going back to (30) , we further have
where (34) is from (30); (35) stems from the nonnegativity of mutual information; (36) follows from Lemma 2 (see below). Similarly, by interchanging the roles of user 1 and user 2, we also have h(y n 1 |w 2 ) − h(y n 2 |w 2 )
Finally, combining (26), (36) and (37) gives the following bound on the sum rate
By setting n → ∞, 1,n → 0, 2,n → 0 and → 0, we get the desired bound (20) . The lemma used in our proof is provided below.
Lemma 2. For J 1 = h(s n 11 |y n 2 , w 1 ), J 2 = h(s n 11 |y n 1 , w 1 ), J 3 = h(s n 12 |y n 2 , s n 11 , w 1 ) and J 4 = h(y n 2 |s n 12 , s n 11 , w 1 ), we have
Proof. See Appendix A.
V. COOPERATIVE JAMMING SCHEME
This section provides the outlines of the cooperative jamming scheme for the two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel defined in Section II-A, where α 11 = α 22 = 1, α 12 = α 21 = α. More details can be found in the long version of this work [27] . In this cooperative jamming scheme, pulse amplitude modulation (PAM) and interference alignment will be used.
1) Codebook generation and signal mapping: To build the codebook, transmitter k, k = 1, 2, generates a total of 2 n(R k +R k ) independent sequences (codewords) v n k , where all the elements of all the sequences are independent and identically distributed according to a distribution that will be designed specifically in the scheme, and R k , R k will be defined later on. The codebook B k is defined as a set of the labeled codewords:
, · · · , 2 nR k } , k = 1, 2, and then randomly chooses a codeword v n k from the selected bin according to a uniform distribution. Since this scheme uses cooperative jamming, the chosen codeword v n k will be mapped to the channel input using a stochastic function given as
for = k, k, = 1, 2, and t = 1, 2, · · · , n, where β u k is a parameter that will be defined later, and {u k (t)} t are i.i.d. random variables (jamming signals) uniformly and independently drawn from a constellation set that will be designed specifically in the scheme.
Let us now define R k and R k as
for some > 0, = k, k, ∈ {1, 2}. From the proof of [22, Theorem 2] (or [5, Theorem 2]) it implies that, given the above codebook and signal mapping, the rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) defined in (45) and (46) is achievable and the messages w 1 and w 2 are secure from their eavesdroppers, that is, I(w 1 ; y n 2 ) ≤ n and I(w 2 ; y n 1 ) ≤ n . In what follows we will design the scheme specifically with PAM constellation and interference alignment to achieve the specific secure rates R 1 and R 2 .
2) PAM constellation and interference alignment: In the proposed jamming scheme, transmitter k generates a codebook with i.i.d. elements, such that each element takes the following form
and then the channel input (cf. (44)) takes the following form
(removing the time index for simplicity), for = k, k, = 1, 2, where v k,c , v k,p and u k are independent random variables uniformly drawn from their PAM constellation sets,
respectively, for k = 1, 2, where Ω(ξ, Q) is the PAM constellation set defined as
for some Q ∈ Z + and ξ ∈ R. The role of ξ is to regularize the average power. γ v k,c , γ v k,p and γ u k are some constants independent of P . In our scheme, {β v k,c , β v k,p , β u k , λ v k,c , λ vp,c , λ u k } k=1,2 are the parameters designed in Table I for different cases of α. Note that for this symmetric Gaussian interference channel, the parameters are designed symmetrically for the two transmitters, for example, β v1,c = β v2,c and β v1,p = β v2,p . For the parameters designed as β v1,c = ∞ and λ v1,c = 0, it implies that the random variable v 1,c can be treated as an empty term in the transmitted signal x 1 . This implication holds for the other parameters. Then the received signals at the receivers take the following forms (without the time index)
With the signal design in (48), the signal v 2,c is aligned with the jamming signal u 1 at receiver 1, while the signal v 1,c is aligned with the jamming signal u 2 at receiver 2.
It can be proved that, the optimal secure sum GDoF characterized in Theorem 1 is achievable by the proposed scheme with cooperative jamming. More details can be found in the long version of this work [27] .
VI. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
This work showed that, a simple scheme without cooperative jamming (i.e., GWC-TIN scheme) can indeed achieve the secure sum capacity to within a constant gap, in a regime (see (18) and (19)) of the two-user Gaussian interference channel. In this GWC-TIN scheme, each transmitter uses a Gaussian wiretap codebook, while each receiver treats interference as noise when decoding the desired message. For the symmetric case, this simple scheme is optimal when the interference-to-signal ratio α is no more than 2/3. However, when the ratio α is more than 2/3, we showed that this simple scheme is not optimal anymore and a scheme with cooperative jamming is proposed to achieve the optimal secure sum GDoF. Specifically, for the symmetric case, we complete the optimal secure sum GDoF characterization for any interference regimes.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Recall that J 1 = h(s n 11 |y n 2 , w 1 ), J 2 = h(s n 11 |y n 1 , w 1 ), J 3 = h(s n 12 |y n 2 , s n 11 , w 1 ), J 4 = h(y n 2 |s n 12 , s n 11 , w 1 ), s 11 (t) = √ P (α11−α12) + h 11 x 1 (t) +z 1 (t), and s 12 (t) = √ P α12 h 12 x 2 (t) + z 1 (t). At first we focus on the lower bound of J 1 :
where (55) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces differential entropy; (56) follows from the fact that h(a|b) = h(a−b|b) for any continuous random variables a and b; the last equality holds true because h(z 1 (t)) = 1 2 log(2πe). Similarly, we have J 3 = h(s n 12 |y n 2 , s n 11 , w 1 ) ≥ h(s n 12 |x n 2 , y n 2 , s n 11 , w 1 ) = h({z 1 (t)} n t=1 ) = n 2 log(2πe). 
Now we focus on the upper bound of J 2 :
where (57) results from chain rule; (58) and (60) follow from the fact that conditioning reduces differential entropy; (59) uses the fact that h(a|b) = h(a − βb|b) for a constant β;
(61) follows from the fact that h z 1 (t)
) for constants β 0 , β 1 and β 2 ; (62) uses the identities 0 ≤ √ P (α11−α12) + − √ P α11−α12 ≤ 1 and P −α12 ≤ 1. Recall that P ≥ 1 and α k ≥ 0, h k ∈ (1, 2], ∀k, ∈ {1, 2}. Similarly, we have the following bound on J 4 : J 4 = h(y n 2 |s n 12 , s n 11 , w 1 ) = n t=1 h(y 2 (t)|y t−1 2 , s n 12 , s n 11 , w 1 )
≤ n t=1 h(y 2 (t)|s 12 (t), s 11 (t)) (64) = n t=1 h y 2 (t) − √ P α22−α12 h 22 h 12 s 12 (t) − P α21−(α11−α12) + h 21 h 11 s 11 (t)|s 12 (t), s 11 (t) (65)
≤ n 2 log 2πe 1 + P α22−α12 · |h 22 | 2 |h 12 | 2 + P α21−(α11−α12) + · |h 21 | 2 |h 11 | 2 where (63) results from chain rule; (64) and (66) follow from the fact that conditioning reduces differential entropy; (65) uses the fact that h(a|b, c) = h(a−β 1 b−β 2 c|b, c) for constants β 1 and β 2 ; the last inequality stems from the fact that h z 2 (t)− β 3 z 1 (t) − β 4z1 (t) ≤ 1 2 log(2πe(1 + β 2 3 + β 2 4 )) for constants β 3 and β 4 . At this point we complete the proof.
APPENDIX B THE GAP BETWEEN SECURE SUM CAPACITY UPPER AND LOWER BOUNDS FOR THEOREM 2
As discussed in Section II-B, the GWC-TIN scheme achieves the secure sum capacity lower bound (see (15) and (16)). In Lemma 1 (see Section IV), we provide a secure sum capacity upper bound, that is, C sum ≤ C ub sum , where C ub sum 1 2 log 1 + P α22−α12 · |h 22 | 2 |h 12 | 2 + P α21−(α11−α12) + · |h 21 | 2 |h 11 | 2 1126 + 1 2 log 1 + P α11−α21 · |h 11 | 2 |h 21 | 2 + P α12−(α22−α21) + · |h 12 | 2 |h 22 | 2 + log 10.
If the following two conditions are satisfied, α 22 + (α 11 − α 12 ) + ≥ α 21 + α 12 (67) α 11 + (α 22 − α 21 ) + ≥ α 21 + α 12 (68) (see (18) and (19)), then the gap between C ub sum and C lb sum is bounded by C ub sum − C lb sum ≤ where (69) uses the fact that h k ∈ (1, 2], ∀k, ∈ {1, 2}; (70) follows from the conditions in (67) and (68); (71) results from the identity that 1+a1b 1+a2b ≤ a1 a2 for any positive numbers a 1 , a 2 and b such that a 1 ≥ 1 ≥ a 2 > 0. Recall that P ≥ 1 and α k ≥ 0, ∀k, ∈ {1, 2}. Note that, the gap can be further reduced by optimizing the computations in converse and achievability.
